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INTRODUCTION
In his seminal work, TORT LAW IN AMERICA, Ted White describes tort
law as vacillating between a focus that is admonitory, emphasizing conduct
that is wrongful, and compensatory, providing the injured with resources to
allay their injuries.1 We are currently in an admonitory period, and,
according to White, we have been since around 1980.2 Moreover, we are not
at the point that the pendulum starts to swing back to a more compensatory
understanding of tort law. We are, however, at a moment of flux in tort
theory.
During this recent period, the dominant understanding of admonition
has been instrumental: Liability is imposed in order to efficiently deter
accidents.3 Tort law is used as a means to the end of promoting safety. That
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1. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 291 (2003).
2. Id. at 244–48.
3. This goal is associated with a law-and-economics approach to tort law, which has been
described as “the dominant theory of torts. It is the theory to meet and beat.” PHILOSOPHY AND
THE LAW OF TORTS 5 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
But see Michael D. Green,
Negligence=Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1643 (1997) (“Negligence no

343

344

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:343

understanding of admonition is increasingly challenged by an alternative:
Tort law provides vindication to those civilly wronged by others.4 In other
words, tort law is not simply about providing incentives to behave better—it
is about the ability to rectify wrongs, placed in the hands of those who
suffered them. Although the latter is a preferable admonitory understanding,
this moment of flux is an excellent opportunity to seek a still-better
alternative. Instead of continuing to vacillate between opposing theories, we
should attempt to blend admonition and compensation. My approach
incorporates Gregory Keating’s focus on distributive justice,5 as well as
access-to-justice concerns.6 The gist of the concept is a tort law that is
generally wrongs-based, while incorporating a form of compensatory
pressure-release valve or bypass.
The goal of this Article is to advocate for this synthesis as a general
approach to tort theory. Incorporating compensation into tort law would
match the motivations of many parties in the tort system and help improve
its administration. I practiced tort law for seven years, usually representing
plaintiffs. Some of my clients were interested in vindication, but the majority
were motivated by compensation, by which I mean they needed money to
pay their medical bills and replace lost wages. There is a problem, however,
with sending both types of plaintiffs into the same tort system. Tort law,
particularly negligence, is uncertain, and that uncertainty leads to delay and
transaction costs as lawyers and experts dispute liability and damages.7 For
plaintiffs interested in vindication, perhaps the time needed to pay close
attention to the facts and circumstances makes sense. After all, determining
whether one has been wronged is a serious inquiry. Those features, however,
are counterproductive to compensating the injured. A system of tort law that
is able to vindicate rights in proper cases, but also efficiently compensate
harms in others, would be ideal.
History both supports the need for a compensatory bypass in tort law
and provides guidance as to the tradeoffs it would likely entail.8 The urge for
compensation has shaped tort law going back over a century, regardless of
whether it was in an admonitory or compensatory phase. Compensation is a
doubt entails a balancing of competing concerns, but those concerns often are not identical to what
a rigorous economic efficiency standard would require.”).
4. A great deal of credit for this change belongs to John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky and their
advocacy of civil recourse theory. See, e.g., JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY,
RECOGNIZING WRONGS (2020).
5. Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74
S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (2000).
6. I thank John Goldberg for this characterization.
7. See infra Section I.
8. See infra Section II.
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particularly powerful motivation during accident surges. Tort history reveals
a pattern of surges of accidents, and a common response to these surges:
recovery becomes more swift and certain, but in smaller amounts.9 Both
parties receive benefits in the compromise. I discuss three examples: (1)
workplace accidents, (2) automobile accidents, and (3) mass disasters. It is
foreseeable that injuries will continue to pressure tort law, and it would be
wise to incorporate a mechanism to handle that pressure. Moreover, a
common response to the pressure of injuries is to compromise, exchanging
ease of compensation for a decrease in its size. Oscar Gray, himself, made
this observation in the context of compensation systems: they generally
involve lesser or no fault requirements and reduced damages.10 Facilitating
such a tradeoff would correspond to the wishes of the parties in many cases
and more efficiently provide both compensation and vindication.
I.

PARTIES’ MOTIVATIONS AND EFFICIENCY

Despite tort theory’s current focus on admonition, many plaintiffs in the
tort system are motivated by compensation. In fact, I believe the majority of
tort plaintiffs are primarily motivated not by vindication but by
compensation—they need money to pay their bills. I base this on my
experience as a practitioner, primarily representing plaintiffs in personal
injury cases. Some of my clients were motivated by vindication; this was
more likely to be true in intensely personal cases like false imprisonment and
defamation. Most of my clients, however, seemed to me primarily motivated
by the pursuit of lost resources. Unlike the common view of plaintiffs as gold
diggers, my clients generally sued reluctantly and only when it became clear
it was necessary to obtain compensation.11
Although this is an anecdotal view,12 it is supported by objective data.
Vindication is best achieved with a public acknowledgment of the claimant’s
victory (i.e., a jury verdict in the claimant’s favor). But if vindication alone
motivated plaintiffs, one would imagine a world in which a large number of
cases were tried to verdict. In reality, the opposite is true: the vast majority
9. See infra Section II.
10. Oscar S. Gray, Future Prospects for Compensation Systems Introduction, 52 MD. L. REV.
893, 894 (1993).
11. Stella Liebeck of the McDonald’s coffee spill case is an example of this attitude. Liebeck
was awarded $160,000 in compensatory damages and $2.7 million in punitive damages, which were
reduced by the trial judge to $480,000. Before filing suit, or even consulting a lawyer, Liebeck
requested that McDonald’s pay her medical bills, approximately $11,000, to resolve the injury.
Kevin G. Cain, And Now, the Rest of the Story…About the McDonald’s Coffee Lawsuit, 45 HOUS.
LAW. 25, 26, 29 (2007). I thank Greg Keating for this point.
12. I have attempted, unsuccessfully, to design a study that would provide more systematic data
on why plaintiffs bring tort claims. It is important, and I hope to try again soon.
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of tort cases settle.13 Marc Galanter finds approximately 98% of civil cases
are resolved before trial.14 There is similar data concerning automobile
accidents—a majority of all tort claims and three-quarters of all payouts15—
which are resolved before trial over 97% of the time.16 Many of these
settlements require plaintiffs to acknowledge a statement by the defendant
denying wrongdoing17 and include confidentiality provisions.18 Other
factors, such as general peace and compensation, which can be especially
pressing for some, must then motivate many claimants.
As noted, there is no large-scale study on why tort plaintiffs file claims,
but a few studies have been conducted specific to medical malpractice. These
studies have found several non-compensatory reasons plaintiffs file suit.
Three reasons are particularly potent: “to get information about and
understand their injury and the circumstances surrounding it, to determine
accountability, and to prevent future injuries.”19 Yet one study of Florida
medical malpractice plaintiffs asked the participants: “If you had had the
opportunity of receiving guaranteed compensation for medical expenses and
lost income caused by the medical injury, but no compensation for pain and
suffering, inconvenience, or other non-economic losses, would you have
taken that opportunity?”20 This question gets directly at the primacy of
compensation as a motivation for plaintiffs. Over thirty percent of the
13. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 465 (2004).
14. Id.
15. JAMES M. ANDERSON, PAUL HEATON & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, RAND INST. FOR CIV.
JUST., THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE 1
(2010).
16. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1495
(2009).
17. Admitting fault is an “extraordinary step.” Associated Press, Pa. Hospital Admits Fault in
Infection That Killed Preemies, Settles Lawsuit, PENNLIVE PATRIOT NEWS (July 15, 2020),
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2020/07/pa-hospital-admits-fault-in-infection-that-killedpreemies-settles-lawsuit.html (statement of plaintiffs’ attorney Matt Casey) (stating that an
admission of fault was “something he said he’s never before seen in a civil settlement in over two
decades of medical malpractice work”).
18. See George L. Blum, Nondisclosure or Confidentiality Agreements in Cases Involving
Products Liability, 40 A.L.R 7th Art. 2, §2 (2019) (“[M]ost defendants in mass tort cases involving
products liability, drugs, or toxic substances will not settle without a secrecy agreement.”); Blanca
Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information About Settlement in an
Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 690 (2001) (“[C]onfidential settlements most likely
account for a large proportion of all settlements.”); Minna J. Kotkin, Reconsidering Confidential
Settlements in the #MeToo Era, 54 U.S.F. L. REV. 517, 525 (2020) (explaining that in employment
discrimination cases, estimates of the number of cases settled secretly range from 60% to 78%).
19. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t Know About the Role of Apologies in
Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2005).
20. Allen W. Imershein & Alan H. Brents, The Impact of Large Medical Malpractice Awards
on Malpractice Awardees, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 33, 40 (1992).
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subjects answered in the affirmative.21 Even in an area of tort law that
involves a personal relationship between the parties and in which many
patients feel a sense of betrayal by their physician,22 this study indicates more
than three out of every ten plaintiffs would accept economic loss alone to
resolve a claim.
Thus, there is a portion of claimants in the tort system for whom
compensation is the primary motivating factor. Forcing these plaintiffs to
use the same tort system inhabited by plaintiffs pursuing vindication is
harmful to both types of plaintiffs. Tort law—negligence especially—is
uncertain; it is based on what a reasonable person would do, and is
compounded by the vagueness of how to value pain and suffering. Working
within these uncertain standards is slow for lawyers and other experts,
resulting in delay and transaction costs. If one is seeking vindication—
righting a wrong—the painstaking attention to detail may be worth it. Not so
for those merely seeking compensation. For those seeking payment for
medical bills and the replacement of lost wages, the further loss of time and
money are just wasteful. Moreover, their presence in the tort system
exacerbates the problems of delay and transaction costs for those seeking
vindication.
When plaintiffs are motivated by compensation, their needs are often
urgent.23 They have creditors waiting to receive money for medical bills, or
for other bills that could not be paid due to their inability to work. Delay is
so detrimental to plaintiffs that one leading scholar, writing decades ago,
noted, “The speeding up of settlements . . . would do more to relieve the
distress of injury victims than any other conceivable change in tort law
administration.”24 If “justice delayed is justice denied,” justice is denied
often in tort law.
A study by the prestigious Harvard School of Public Health found that
the average medical malpractice case takes five years from the time of the
injury to resolution, and one in three cases lasts six years or longer.25 This is
a long time for a plaintiff to wait to recover lost funds, but defendants suffer,
too. Defendants such as physicians and manufacturers are distracted from
their primary work; prolonged litigation reduces the amount of time available
21. Id.
22. Id. at 41.
23. An earlier version of this argument is found in JEFFREY O’CONNELL & CHRISTOPHER J.
ROBINETTE, A RECIPE FOR BALANCED TORT REFORM 29–49 (2008).
24. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 826 (2011)
(quoting Alfred F. Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MICH. L. REV. 279,
315 (1964)).
25. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2031 (2006).
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for more productive efforts.26 The Harvard School of Public Health authors
stated, “These are long periods for plaintiffs to await decisions about
compensation and for defendants to endure the uncertainty, acrimony, and
time away from patient care that litigation entails.”27 In addition to creating
problems for the parties to the tort cases in question, delay clogs the dockets
of the judicial system, forcing parties in other disputes to wait until earlier
cases are resolved.
Delay is problematic beyond complex malpractice cases. A recent study
examined all publicly recorded foodborne illness settlements and verdicts in
the United States between 2000 and 2011.28 From the time of the incident
until the time of resolution, the average length of resolution was 3.35 years;
one case took fourteen years to resolve.29 Cases going to trial averaged 3.66
years before a final verdict; cases that settled were somewhat faster, at 2.93
years, although one settlement took ten years to complete.30
Although problematic by itself, delay is associated with the further
difficulty of transaction costs. As cases grind on, lawyers and experts for
both sides are busy working and billing. Lawyers representing plaintiffs
typically charge a contingency fee of 33%, and sometimes up to 50%, of
gross recovery.31 Defendants or their insurers pay lawyers either an hourly
rate or a flat fee, regardless of whether they win or lose. In addition to
lawyers, parties in many types of tort cases must pay experts. In the early
1990s, a products liability litigation guide included multiple examples of a
plaintiff’s advanced expenses totaling several hundred thousand dollars.32 In
2002, Gary Schwartz estimated that the average plaintiff’s medical
malpractice expenses (not including attorneys’ fees) were approximately
$50,000 per case.33

26. In 2006, I spoke to an orthopedic surgeon who told me that he had been sued twice in his
career. Both cases lasted over ten years, and both cases resulted in him being dismissed from the
suit.
27. Studdert et al., supra note 25, at 2031.
28. Alexia Brunet Marks, Check Please: Using Legal Liability to Inform Food Safety
Regulation, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 723, 723–24 (2013).
29. Id. at 768.
30. Id.; see also Jeffrey O’Connell & Craig A. Stanton, Justice Delayed Is . . . Delay Ignored:
The Indifference of Judges and Law Professors to Legal Lassitude, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 489, 489–
90, 494 (1999) (describing a study conducted in four leading Torts casebooks which revealed fiftyone cases that went to trial, with the average time from incident until appellate decision being 6.94
years; in almost half the cases, the judges ordered a remand or a new trial).
31. Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data
and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653, 657 (2003).
32. 3 JOHN F. VARGO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY PRACTICE GUIDE § 42.065a, at 42, 56.15–.16
(Matthew Bender ed., 1992).
33. Gary T. Schwartz, Empiricism and Tort Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (2002).
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Transaction costs ultimately reduce the amount of money reaching the
plaintiff as compensation. In 2018, a study conducted by the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform estimated that of every dollar
spent in the tort system, only fifty-seven cents go towards compensating
plaintiffs for their injuries.34 The remaining money was consumed in “cost[s]
of litigation, insurance expenses, and risk transfer costs.” 35 Although the
U.S. Chamber pursues a tort reform agenda, the percentages in its study
estimate tort law to be more efficient than many other sources of data, going
back decades. For example, the Harvard School of Public Health study
referenced earlier found that 54% of the money expended in the medical
malpractice cases in its sample was spent on transaction costs, leaving
plaintiffs only 46%.36 Other studies have found the percentage of money
reaching plaintiffs as compensation in medical malpractice cases is even
lower, at 40%.37 Transaction costs in products liability cases are similar, with
studies finding the percentage of money reaching plaintiffs in the low fortypercent range.38
Transaction costs have bedeviled tort law for decades. A major study
in the 1980s concluded that tort law’s administrative costs were 54% of net
plaintiff benefits.39 There was an efficiency difference within torts, however:
“The plaintiffs’ net compensation as a percentage of the total expenditures
was 52 percent for auto torts and 43 percent for all other torts.”40 Joanna
34. PAUL HINTON, DAVID MCKNIGHT & LAWRENCE POWELL, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM, COSTS AND COMPENSATION OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM 24 (2018),
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/Tort_costs_paper_FINAL_WEB.pdf.
35. Id. at 26. Taking fault out of the process is not a panacea; parties still fight over causation
and other things. It can, however, reduce transaction costs substantially. Workers’ compensation’s
transaction costs are approximately 21%, less than half those of tort law. Nora Freeman Engstrom,
Exit, Adversarialism, and the Stubborn Persistence of Tort, 6 J. TORT L. 75, 82–83 (2013).
36. Studdert et al., supra note 25, at 2031.
37. Joanna M. Shepherd, Products Liability and Economic Activity: An Empirical Analysis of
Tort Reform’s Impact on Businesses, Employment, and Production, 66 VAND. L. REV. 257, 286
n.159 (2013) (first citing PETER W. HUBER, THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 151
(1988) (concluding that plaintiffs receive forty cents of every dollar paid by defendants in medical
malpractice cases); and then citing Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, in 1B
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1339, 1369 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds.,
2000) (“concluding that plaintiffs receive forty cents of every dollar paid by defendants in medical
malpractice cases”)“”).
38. Shepherd, supra note 37, at 286 n.159 (first citing STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST.
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION 104 (2005) (“concluding that plaintiffs receive fortytwo cents of every dollar paid by defendants in asbestos cases”); and then citing HUBER, supra note
37, at 151 (“concluding that plaintiffs receive forty cents of every dollar paid by defendants in
products liability cases”)).
39. JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS AND
COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 70 (1986).
40. Id.
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Shepherd summarizes tort law’s transaction costs problem: “Hence, for every
dollar defendants pay to compensate victims, an additional dollar and change
is spent on legal and administrative expenses. Moreover, as legal fees and
litigation delays continue to increase, this inefficiency will only worsen.”41
The problems of delay and transaction costs can be traced to tort law’s
overwhelming uncertainty. All law is potentially subject to factual
uncertainty, but beyond that “it is not always clear how a tort rule applies to
the (undisputed) facts.”42 Unfortunately, this is true in a double sense. Robert
Rabin notes that accident law “is open-textured both in the liability
determination of fault and the damages determination of noneconomic
harm.”43 In other words, the standard for determining whether someone is
liable is vague, and once that decision is made, determining how much they
owe in damages is also vague.
In strict products liability, the liability issue is whether a product is
defective. A product may have one of three types of defect: manufacturing,
design, or warning.44 Design and warning claims are by far the most common
and consequential products liability cases.45 Yet David Owen describes
design and warning notions as covered in “shrouds of mist . . . so vague that
they are often effectively meaningless.”46 He continues, “One indeed may
ask whether ‘law’ itself exists in such terrain, or whether ‘lawless’ is the
better word to describe the prevailing ‘rule’ of random guilt.”47
In terms of design defects, jurisdictions are not uniform, but the majority
appears to follow the risk-utility test.48 Owen finds little comfort in the
apparent consensus:
First, there is no single clearly accepted view as to how the design defect
balancing test should be described or formulated. A related finding is that
there is considerable variation in how the balancing test is formulated among
the states, among decisions within the same state, and often even within the
same judicial opinion. Another finding is that courts today quite typically
cobble together a variety of separate and often conflicting formulations of
balancing tests borrowed, without analysis, from earlier opinions. Further,
41. Shepherd, supra note 37, at 286–87.
42. Mark A. Geistfeld, Legal Ambiguity, Liability Insurance, and Tort Reform, 60 DEPAUL L.
REV. 539, 540 (2011).
43. Robert L. Rabin, The Pervasive Role of Uncertainty in Tort Law: Rights and Remedies, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 432 (2011).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIABILITY § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
45. Geistfeld, supra note 42, at 544.
46. David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37 (1982).
47. Id.
48. Geistfeld, supra note 42, at 547.
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many courts acknowledge that a variety of factors should be balanced but
neither discriminate between the various factors nor explain how they should
be balanced or otherwise interrelate.49
The standard for warnings is no better. The Reporters for the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, James Henderson and
Aaron Twerski, state that the doctrine is “little more than an empty
shell. . . . [as] such a tort is too lawless to be fair or useful.”50
Determining liability in medical malpractice cases is equally difficult.
There are a number of potentially liable defendants to sort through:
physicians, nurses, hospitals, and manufacturers of equipment and
pharmaceuticals. Complicating matters further, a study by the Institute of
Medicine found that adverse results in health care are not typically caused by
the fault of a single individual, but instead by complex, multicausal, systemic
interactions.51 Such a finding, however, is inconsistent with most medical
malpractice litigation, in which plaintiffs’ lawyers focus on the fault of
individuals.52
Additionally, proving fault in malpractice cases, whether of an
individual or a system, is often difficult because of the nature of the human
body. The body is made up of intricate, interlocking parts that require years
of devoted study to properly understand. Yet, we require lay people to
distinguish adverse consequences due to fault from preexisting conditions
that further develop during treatment. And we require them to do so within
the time constraints of a trial often taking less than a week. Moreover, the
education process provided to jurors often includes conflicting and confusing
technical expert testimony regarding the defendant’s or defendants’
negligence.
Despite these difficulties, the results of medical malpractice litigation
do not appear to be arbitrary; data suggest that there is a correlation between
fault and liability.53 For example, the Harvard School of Public Health study
determined the assessment of liability in the tort system was correct nearly

49. Id. (quoting David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 239, 242 (1997)).
50. Id. at 547–48 (quoting James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse
in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 326 (1990)).
51. COMM’N ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999).
52. NEIL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS
151–69 (2000).
53. Philip G. Peters, Jr., What We Know About Malpractice Settlements, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1783,
1785 (2007) (conducting a meta-study and concluding that settlement outcomes are driven by the
strength of plaintiff’s case).
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three-quarters of the time.54 That means, however, that despite taking an
average of five years to resolve disputes, the tort system still gets it wrong
over a quarter of the time. Plaintiffs should be particularly concerned about
incorrect outcomes. According to a meta-study determining an error rate for
and against each party, plaintiffs win approximately 10–20% of cases with
weak evidence of negligence and 50% of cases with strong evidence
thereof.55 Thus, plaintiffs win between 10% and 20% of cases they probably
should lose, but lose half of the cases they probably should win.
Uncertainty is not only a problem in determining liability in complex
products and medical malpractice cases; it affects simple negligence cases as
well. Kenneth Abraham demonstrates the uncertainty of the “reasonablecare-under-the-circumstances” standard by focusing on the job of the
factfinder.56 The finder of fact must: (1) determine the empirical facts, such
as what actions the defendant took; (2) determine what kind of care and how
much of it was necessary under the particular circumstances, and (3) decide
whether the defendant met the standard annunciated in step two.57 Abraham
describes the second step as “an act of discretionary norm creation” specific
to the facts and circumstances of this case.58 Moreover, Abraham notes that
the norm creation in most negligence cases is “unbounded,” meaning the
factfinder uses its “own general normative sense of the situation, informed
by individual experience and by the evidence submitted by the parties.”59
Abraham reveals the complexities of unbounded norm creation even in
“the simplest of negligence cases,”60 a slip-and-fall arguably caused by
negligent snow removal on a sidewalk. What does reasonable care require?
Abraham presents a list of potentially relevant factors: How much snow the
defendant removed initially, whether the defendant inspected the premises
later, the visibility of the ice, the number and steepness of the stairs, whether
there was a railing, how long the area was in the sunlight during the day, and
the snow removal customs in the neighborhood.61 Thus, the finder of fact
faces numerous decision points: “[E]ach of these items of evidence is a
potential predicate for the application of a norm to the facts of the case—for
example, that a homeowner should remove all but the tiniest bits of snow

54.
55.
56.
(2001).
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Studdert et al., supra note 25, at 2028.
Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1464 (2007).
Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1190–91
Id.
Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1193.
Id.

2021]

HARMONIZING WRONGS AND COMPENSATION

353

from steps, [or] that subsequent inspection is (or is not) necessary.”62 Except
in the unlikely event that any of the precautions are mandated by statute or
ordinance, “the failure of the defendant to employ the precaution is simply
an optional basis for the negligence decision by the finder of fact [who] . . . is
simply directed to weigh all the evidence in deciding whether the defendant
was or was not negligent.”63
If, as seen, “[t]he standard of reasonable care is notoriously vague,” 64
the standard for measuring pain-and-suffering damages is even worse. Take
the California jury instructions as an example. In California, for
“Noneconomic Damage[s],” the factfinder is told: “No fixed standard exists
for deciding the amount of these noneconomic damages.”65 The factfinder is
also warned: “You must use your judgment to decide a reasonable amount
based on the evidence and your common sense.”66
Stating that pain and suffering is vague is merely to paraphrase the jury
instruction: “No fixed standard exists for deciding the amount of these
noneconomic damages.”67 Moreover the use of the words “judgment,”
“reasonable,” and “common sense” in a single sentence is a warning of
intense subjectivity.68 Such vagueness creates a number of problems. One
is “a lack of ‘horizontal equity.”69 Juries award very different amounts of
money for similar injuries, creating a large amount of variation within an
injury category.70 Even worse than the seeming randomness of such a
distribution is the truth that these decisions are often influenced by factors

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Geistfeld, supra note 42, at 547. Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court of the
United States has limited the awards of punitive damages based on the Due Process Clause. See,
e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“[F]ew awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree,
will satisfy due process”); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–85 (1996)
(setting three guideposts to determine if punitive damage awards satisfy due process: (1) the degree
of reprehensibility of the conduct; (2) the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages; and
(3) sanctions for similar misconduct); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991)
(holding that the Due Process Clause applies to punitive damages awards). The Court’s limits are
based on certain constitutional concerns: arbitrary deprivation of one’s property, fair notice of the
precise conduct to be avoided, and poor decision-making by judges or juries. State Farm, 538 U.S.
at 417–18. Geistfeld is so concerned about tort law’s vagueness, he maintains that basic tort awards
implicate these concerns to the same extent as punitive damages. Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional
Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1099–100 (2005).
65. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3905A (2017).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Geistfeld, supra note 64, at 1107.
70. Id.
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such as race, gender, and socioeconomic status.71 Such factors carry more
weight when the standard is vague.
For present purposes, the problem with the vagueness of pain and
suffering damages is that it exacerbates the problem of vagueness in the
standard for liability. Measuring pain and suffering causes tremendous
administrative costs.72
Litigation is increased because the double
vagueness—is the defendant liable and how much should they pay if they
are—allows the parties’ evaluations of the claim to substantially diverge.73
Divergences in expectations impede settlement, both reducing its likelihood
and increasing the time and money needed to reach accord.74
Again, if a plaintiff is primarily motivated to right a wrong, the
reasonable person standard can allow for a robust examination of the facts
and circumstances. The delay and transaction costs involved are an
unfortunate byproduct, but may, perhaps, be justified by the search for truth.75
If, however, a plaintiff simply wants to replace lost income, the uncertainty,
delay, and transaction costs are intolerable. They postpone and diminish
what can be urgently needed funds. A compensatory alternative, as history
demonstrates, could have advantages for both plaintiffs and defendants.
71. Id. at 1107–08.
72. Jeffrey O’Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding Early Offers as a Simple, if SecondBest, Alternative to Tort Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 858, 871 (1999).
73. See 2 A.L.I. REPORTERS’ STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY
202 (1991); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, The Vicissitudes of Tort: A Response to Professors
Rabin, Sebok & Zipursky, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 695, 696 (2011) (emphasizing that the certainty of
rules can operate in a “pro-liability direction”).
74. P.S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION, AND THE LAW 216 (3d ed. 1980); Joseph H.
King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV.
163, 196–97 (2004); O’Connell & Eaton, supra note 72, at 871.
For an extreme example, involving punitive damages, of tort law’s transaction costs and delay,
consider the Exxon Valdez case over an oil spill off the coast of Alaska. Even though negligence
was not an issue, and the captain was admittedly drunk, the case lasted decades. Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 477 (2008). The accident occurred on the evening of March 24, 1989,
and the Supreme Court rendered an opinion on the case on June 25, 2008, vacating a Ninth Circuit
opinion and remanding. Id. at 476, 515. The Ninth Circuit made an award and remanded the case
to the district court for entry of final judgment on June 15, 2009. Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 568 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009). In 1994, the jury handed down the punitive damages
verdict and lead plaintiffs’ counsel hugged his three-year-old son. Richard Lempert, Low
Probability/High Consequence Events: Dilemmas of Damage Compensation, 58 DEPAUL L. REV.
357, 368–69 (2009). An Exxon lawyer stated: “He’ll be in college before you get any of that
money.” Id. at 369 (quoting Robert E. Jenkins & Jill W. Kastner, Comment, Running Aground in
a Sea of Complex Litigation: A Case Comment on the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 18 UCLA J. ENV’T
L. & POL’Y 151, 192 (2000)). Transaction costs were astronomical. Id. at 368. More than 1,000
depositions were taken over 2,500 deposition days. Id. More than sixty law firms were involved.
Id. Ten years into the saga, it was estimated that Exxon had already spent $300 million on its
defense. Id. Plaintiffs’ attorneys were to receive 22.4% of all funds eventually paid. Id.
75. I suspect even vindication-oriented plaintiffs have problems with delay and transaction
costs.
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II. HISTORY
Tort history can teach us several things about the desirability of a
compensatory tort bypass.76 First, going back over a century, compensation
has been a primary motivating factor for a substantial portion of plaintiffs.
This is true in both admonitory and more compensatory phases. In other
words, the compensatory focus of a portion of current plaintiffs is not an
anomaly and is unlikely to go away. Instead, it should be accommodated.
Second, compensatory urges are most obvious during surges of accidents.
Accident surges heighten suffering, which needs to be alleviated, and also
make compensatory solutions more possible due to the sheer number of
accidents. Third, the compensatory solutions that have arisen from accident
surges demonstrate a pattern that can be useful in designing a compensatory
bypass.
The compensatory pressure of injuries repeatedly shapes the law. Ever
since the mid-nineteenth century—when negligence became a separate tort
and the Industrial Revolution produced new ways to maim the human body—
tort law has experienced waves of injuries. These waves, often spurred by
technology,77 have occurred throughout the history of negligence law. They
amount to a mass of suffering human beings seeking compensation from a
system focused on limiting liability. The restrictions were particularly rigid
during negligence’s first several decades. There is no reason to think these
waves of injuries will cease; thus, we should design tort law to absorb the
pressures we know are coming.
The law follows a pattern in response to the surges. The law generally
responds in a compensatory manner, such as by relaxing requirements to
recover, either formally or informally, in exchange for a reduction in the
amount of recovery. In this compromise, both parties receive a benefit.
Claimants gain more swift and certain access to (sometimes desperately)
needed funds, while defendants (and their insurers) get smaller, more
predictable payouts. A compensatory mechanism making it easier for the
parties to reach such a consistently favored result would improve tort law’s
ability to achieve both compensation and vindication. In this Section, I will
discuss three examples of the pattern: workers’ compensation, automobile
accidents, and mass disasters.

76. Portions of this section are adapted from Christopher J. Robinette, Why Civil Recourse
Theory Is Incomplete, 78 TENN. L. REV. 431 (2011).
77. See generally Donald G. Gifford, Technological Triggers to Tort Revolutions: Steam
Locomotives, Autonomous Vehicles, and Accident Compensation, 11 J. TORT L. 71 (2018).
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A. Workers’ Compensation
Until the mid-nineteenth century, there was no overarching tort of
negligence.78 Negligence “emerged from the action of trespass on the case
to take fairly clear shape in a few prescient judicial decisions and bits of
commentary during the 1860s.”79 As negligence was emerging as a cause of
action, its potential application exploded.
After the Civil War,
industrialization and the growth of railroads dramatically increased the risk
of injury, particularly to people in the workplace.80 John Witt describes the
results: “Industrializing economies in the mid to late nineteenth century
experienced an explosion of accident rates alongside the rapid development
of new industries and more powerful machinery.”81 Industrialization’s injury
rates surpassed even those of the war.82 Not only were there more injuries,
those injuries were more severe. As Donald Gifford states: “Locomotives,
automobiles, and industrial machinery were more likely to result in crippling
or even fatal injuries than were horses that threw a rider or the carelessness
of coworkers using hand-tools.”83
The 1850 census was the first to calculate national deaths from
accidents.84 Between 1850 and 1880, “the [percentage] of deaths attributable
to accident[s] among men aged ten to fifty increased by over 70 percent,
[rising] from 7 percent to 12 percent.”85 The worst category of accidental
injuries, by far, was workplace injuries, which “represent[ed] close to onethird of all accidental deaths and . . . between one-half and two-thirds of all
accidental injuries.”86 In 1890, railroad worker death rates were 314 per
100,000 workers per year.87 Also in 1890, coal mining deaths “rang[ed] from
215 deaths per 100,000 workers per year in bituminous coal mines to 300
deaths per 100,000 workers per year in anthracite coal mines.”88 Trainmen,
who “operat[ed] the coupling devices between [rail]cars, and brakemen, who
operated the train’s handbrakes, died in work-related accidents at rates of 900
78. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 20 (2008).
79. Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1260 (2001).
80. ABRAHAM, supra note 78, at 26–27.
81. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 22 (2004).
82. Id. at 24 (quoting BUREAU OF STAT. OF LABOR & INDUS. OF N.J., THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT 367 (1890)).
83. Gifford, supra note 77, at 124.
84. WITT, supra note 81, at 26 (citing J. D. B. DE BOW, U.S. CENSUS, MORTALITY STATISTICS
OF THE SEVENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1850, at 17–20 (’1886)).
85. WITT, supra note 81, at 26.
86. Id. at 27.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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and 1,141 deaths per 100,000 workers per year, respectively.”89 In
comparison to contemporary accident rates, those around the turn of the
twentieth century were horrifying: A 1912 study of accidental deaths
“estimated 82,500 deaths per year; [since then], the population of the United
States has tripled, but the number of accidental deaths has increased by less
than a quarter.”90
Witt summarizes: “Industrialization . . . had
devised . . . new and unfamiliar mechanisms for inflicting harm on the human
body.”91
An increase in litigation accompanied the increase in the number and
severity of accidental injuries. Between 1870 and 1890, “the number of
accident suits being litigated in New York City’s state courts grew almost
eightfold; by 1910 the number had grown again” more than five times.92
From 1870 until 1910, the percentage of tort cases in New York City’s trial
courts’ contested caseload increased from 4.2 to 40.9%.93
Tort law provided little relief for this mass of workplace injuries. A
leading Torts casebook states that tort provided “relatively few instances of
compensation” for workplace incidents during this time.94 In his treatise,
William Prosser presents various estimates placing the percentage of
uncompensated workplace accidents between 70% and 87%.95 The
limitations were both doctrinal and practical. Doctrinally, many courts—at
least in workplace accident cases—found that if the employer’s conduct was
consistent with custom in the trade or business, the employer was not
negligent as a matter of law.96 But the “most significant aspect of the
doctrinal development”97 was the “unholy trinity” 98 of defenses at the
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 59.
Id. (citing RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN NEW
YORK CITY, 1870–1910, at 20 tbl. 4 (1992)). Gifford chronicles several factors that laid the
groundwork for an increase in litigation at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth
centuries. Gifford, supra note 83, at 80–83. They include: (1) the demise of the complicated writ
pleading system, (2) the abolition of the witness disqualification rule (see generally Kenneth S.
Abraham & G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Civil Trial and the Emergence of
American Tort Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 468 (2017)), (3) the advent of the contingent fee, and (4)
the advent of liability insurance. Gifford, supra note 83, at 80–83.
94. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE, AND
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1268 (13th ed. 2015).
95. G. Edward White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century: An Historical Perspective, 32
VILL. L. REV. 1265, 1271 n.13 (1987) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 530 n.32 (4th ed. 1971)).
96. Gifford, supra note 77, at 95.
97. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 94, at 1267.
98. Id.
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employer’s disposal: the fellow servant rule, assumption of risk, and
contributory negligence.
The fellow servant rule, in most cases, prevented an employee from
recovering from the employer if the injury was caused by the tortious conduct
of another employee.99 Assumption of risk allowed an employer to escape
liability even if it had been negligent if the employee accepted or continued
in the employment after notice of such negligence.100 Finally, contributory
negligence allowed an employer to escape liability despite its own negligence
if the employee had been even slightly negligent himself.101 On a practical
level, employees or their families were forced to find the courage to sue the
hand that fed them. Even if they managed to find that courage, “[l]ong,
drawn-out litigation placed severe financial burdens upon workers.”102 In the
end, “the realities of wealth and ineffectual representational institutions for
workers”103 made the recovery of compensation rare.
Attorney Crystal Eastman provided an illustration of tort’s
compensatory limitations. In her influential book Work-Accidents and the
Law,104 Eastman reviewed 526 workplace deaths in Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania during parts of 1906 and 1907.105 Nearly all fatal workplace
accidents, 523 of 526, killed men; almost half were married men, and 63%
were the sole supporter of their family.106 In over half of those cases, “the
widow and children were left by the employer to bear the entire income
loss.”107 In only 30% of the cases did the family receive over $500, which
was approximately a year’s income for the lowest paid of the deceased
workers.108
In advocating for a change to the common law tort system, Eastman
“organize[d] work-accident debates around the image of the wounded
family.”109 Highlighting her finding that 63% of the deceased men in her
study were the sole supporter of their family, she stated, “[t]he people who

99. Gifford, supra note 83, at 95.
100. Id. at 96.
101. Id. at 96–97.
102. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 94, at 1267.
103. Id. at 1268.
104. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW (Paul Underwood Kellogg ed.,
1910).
105. Id. at 119.
106. Id. at 119–20.
107. Id. at 121.
108. Id. at 122. The 30% figure is likely on the high side; Ms. Eastman made several liberal
assumptions to reach it. See id. at 121–22 (stating that this figure was reached by “assuming that
all the unknown amounts were large and that all suits pending would be decided for the plaintiff”).
109. WITT, supra note 81, at 130.
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perished were of those upon whom the world leans.”110 She described the
lives of the widows and orphans left behind by workplace accidents,
complete with poignant photographs.111 One widow and her children, for
example, were forced to leave their home and move into the back rooms of a
parent’s house.112 Other commissions studying workplace accidents “also
made dependent wives and children central objects of concern.”113 For
example, the New York State Employers’ Liability Commission stated the
families of injured or killed workmen “must depend upon the work of women
and children, or upon the assistance of relatives and friends, must reduce their
standard of living to the detriment of health, and must often become destitute
and dependent upon charity.”114
Once Eastman’s book was published in 1910, support for workers’
compensation spread like a “prairie fire.”115 In the years after New York
adopted the first workers’ compensation program in the United States,116 it
became the law in jurisdiction after jurisdiction.117 Workers’ compensation,
as its name indicates, is based on compensatory principles. Whereas tort law
was believed to be based on fault,118 greatly reducing the role of fault in
workplace injuries was one of the primary attractions of workers’
compensation.119 The law, which was adopted as a substitute for tort,
eliminated the requirement of proving fault on the part of the employer.120
Instead the employee need only demonstrate the injury was work-related,
“arising out of or in the course of employment,”121 making it much easier to
recover. That the purpose was compensatory—providing resources to allay
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

EASTMAN, supra note 104, at 119.
Id. at 137.
Id.
WITT, supra note 81, at 131.
N.Y. STATE EMP’S. LIAB. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK BY THE COMMISSION APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518 OF THE LAWS OF 1909 TO INQUIRE
INTO THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY AND OTHER MATTERS 27 (1910) [hereinafter
WCR].
115. WITT, supra note 81, at 127.
116. Id.
117. Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’ Compensation in the
United States, 1900–1930, 41 J. L. & ECON. 305, 320 tbl.2 (1998).
118. See, e.g., WCR, supra note 114, at 10 (“The New York system of liability is, speaking
generally, founded on fault . . . . That is the fundamental principle of our law, inherited from the
common law of England, which no statute in this State has ever changed.”).
119. Christopher Howard, Workers’ Compensation, Federalism, and the Heavy Hand of History,
16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 28, 32 (2002). Workers’ compensation does not abandon the concept of
responsibility. See Gregory C. Keating, Is Tort Law “Private”?, in CIVIL WRONGS AND JUSTICE
IN PRIVATE LAW 362 (Paul B. Miller & John Oberdiek, eds., 2020) (describing workers’
compensation as a form of “collective responsibility”).
120. Fishback & Kantor, supra note 117, at 309.
121. Id. at 305–06.
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injuries—is underscored by the focus on easing the suffering of injured
workers and their families.122
Workers’ compensation allowed those injured on the job to recover
more swift and certain compensation, but it was not one-sided. In what
became known as the “Grand Bargain,”123 employers and their insurers
gained smaller, more predictable payouts. Witt describes the bargain as “a
kind of rough-justice in any one case, splitting the difference as between
employers and employees.”124 Cases “would no longer get bogged down in
litigating thorny questions of fault”125; instead, “injured employees would be
compensated for virtually all injuries arising out of and in the course of their
work.”126 On the other hand, “[d]amages would not be at the discretion of a
jury or designed to make the injured employee whole, as in the law of torts,
but would instead be scheduled at one-half or two-thirds the injured
employees [sic] lost wages, plus medical costs.”127 In short, as befits a
bargain, grand or otherwise, “employees, employers, and insurance carriers
all saw the adoption of workers’ compensation as to their mutual benefit.”128
B. Automobile Accidents
Shortly after the states began adopting workers’ compensation statutes,
efforts to reform automobile accidents based on compensatory principles
were expected.129 The history of reform efforts for automobile accidents
resembled that of workplace accidents. Just as before, there was a surge in
automobile accidents along with congestion in the courts. Also as before, the
automobile accident reform attempts were based on compensatory principles.
The reform efforts, however, were also different in significant ways. The
formal reform of automobile accidents took much longer and was less
sweeping than workers’ compensation. More importantly, however,

122. See id. at 306 (discussing “the financial protection that workers’ compensation provided
injured workers and their families”).
123. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, Can State Constitutions Block the Workers’ Compensation
Race to the Bottom?, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2017).
124. Id. at 1082 n.3 (quoting John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and
American Tort Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1186–87 (2005)).
125. Id. (quoting John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort
Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1186–87 (2005)).
126. Id. (quoting John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort
Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1186–87 (2005)).
127. Id. (quoting John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort
Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1186–87 (2005)).
128. Id. at 1083.
129. See Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235, 367–
68 (1914).
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substantial alteration of the manner in which automobile accident claims
were processed came informally.
A dramatic increase in automobile accidents occurred between the mid1910s and the early 1930s. Between 1915 and 1932, deaths due to
automobile accidents “multiplied over seven times.”130 Moreover, in 1932,
the “automobile fatality rate ha[d] increased more than 500% since 1913,
while the death rate for other kinds of accidents show[ed] a decline of over
30% for the same period.”131 Writing in 1925 in the Columbia Law Review,
a scholar stated:
Formerly, when horse drawn vehicles, slow in movement and few
in number, were the principal means of transportation, there was
comparatively little danger in the use of the streets. But the
increasing use and speed of automobiles have made our streets
more dangerous than our factories and are causing a greater loss of
life and a greater number of casualties or losses than in the World
War.132
In short, as automobiles became increasingly common, they created “a hellish
carnage.”133
Once more, the increase in accidents led to congestion in the courts.
Automobile accidents constituted thirty percent of all new cases on the
Supreme Court of New York County’s calendar between October 1928 and
April 1930.134 Additionally, a study of the Courts of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County found that automobile accident cases were half of all
cases tried to a jury.135
Formal tort reform of automobile accidents was slow and piecemeal. A
significant early effort was the 1932 “Columbia Plan,” produced by the
Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents (“the
Committee”), a group of academics, lawyers, and social scientists under the
auspices of Columbia University.136 The Committee proposed compulsory
130. COLUMBIA UNIV. COUNCIL FOR RSCH. IN THE SOC. SCI., REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO
STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL
FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 17 (1932) [hereinafter COLUMBIA PLAN].
131. Id.
132. Gifford, supra note77, at 110 (quoting Robert S. Marx, Compulsory Compensation
Insurance, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 164, 167 (1925)).
133. Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile Accidents, Insurance, and the
Challenge to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 1919 to 1941, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 521, 540 (1998)
(“The rapid growth of motoring coupled with unimproved roads and a population with no historical
experience driving such machines, combined to generate a hellish carnage that is difficult to
appreciate in our era of air bags, engineered highways, and automobile conscious people.”).
134. COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note 130, at 20.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 2–3.
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automobile liability insurance paying benefits without reference to fault. 137
The Columbia Plan was explicitly based on compensation. The Committee
drafted an outline that provided: “[T]he main purpose of [the] compensation
plan is to spread through insurance the inevitable losses due to automobile
accidents.”138 Similar to Eastman’s focus on the wounded family in WorkAccidents and the Law, the Columbia Plan covered the plight of accident
victims’ families and included numerous individual “case studies” that
humanized the effect of automobile accidents.139 The Columbia Plan did not
garner enough political support to be enacted in any jurisdiction; automobile
accident reforms were placed on the backburner as the Great Depression and
World War II consumed national attention.140
Scholars continued to focus on automobile accident reform, and a
breakthrough occurred in 1965 when Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O’Connell
published Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim: A Blueprint for Reforming
Automobile Insurance.141 Keeton and O’Connell noted the continued surge
in automobile accidents: “In 1963 the death toll reached a new high of 43,600,
which was in turn eclipsed by a figure of about 47,000 to 48,000 in 1964.” 142
Furthermore, these accidents continued to cause court congestion that was
described by Keeton and O’Connell as “crushing.”143 The authors proposed
that states adopt no-fault automobile laws in which mandatory first-party
insurance would cover economic loss caused by personal injuries.144 In
essence, up until a certain monetary threshold—perhaps $10,000—a driver’s
own insurer would pay the driver for economic loss from personal injuries
suffered in automobile accidents, without reference to fault.145 Tort liability
was reserved for larger cases—those above the threshold—but the recovery
would be reduced by the amount already provided through first-party

137. ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 138 (1965).
138. Young B. Smith, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUM. L.
REV. 785, 799 (1932). Deterrence was disclaimed: “The problem of compensation for injuries
caused by such accidents rather than the problem of accident prevention has been the Committee’s
field of study.” COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note 130, at 1 (footnote omitted). The Committee also
questioned the principle of fault: “The Committee believes that the principle of liability for fault
only is a principle of social expediency, and that it is not founded on any immutable basis of right.”
Id. at 212.
139. COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note 130, at 4, 223–35.
140. Joseph A. Page, Roscoe Pound, Melvin Belli, and the Personal-Injury Bar: The Tale of an
Odd Coupling, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 637, 668 (2009).
141. KEETON & O’CONNELL, supra note 137.
142. Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 13.
144. Id. at 7, 9.
145. See id. at 7.
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insurance.146 The idea was to efficiently resolve smaller cases, leaving the
resources of the court system available to process more significant cases.
No-fault insurance was based on compensatory principles.147 Keeton &
O’Connell concluded that neither fault nor deterrence was an entirely
sufficient reason to shift losses.148 Instead, they argued that “the burden of a
minimum level of protection against measurable economic loss” should be
“treated as a cost of motoring.”149 Specifically, they contended that “[t]he
cost of providing this minimum level of compensation for traffic victims
would be distributed generally among the persons who benefit from
motoring, without regard to fault in particular accidents.” 150 In the 1970s,
sixteen states adopted some version of no-fault automobile law.151
Thus, automobile accident tort reform, as a formal matter, was delayed
and unsystematic. Informally, however, there was a substantial reform of the
way in which automobile accident claims were processed. The informal
reform—routinization of the claims process—was also a product of the surge
in automobile accidents, was compensatory in nature, and can be traced
primarily to liability insurance.152
The surge of automobile accidents and the need to compensate victims
led to reform of insurance laws. In January 1927, new automobile insurance
mandates went into effect in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Massachusetts
adopted a compulsory automobile insurance law, meaning it is illegal to
operate a vehicle without an insurance policy in effect.153 On the other hand,
Connecticut adopted a financial responsibility law.154 Unlike a compulsory
law, a financial responsibility law generally did not require purchasing
insurance until after an accident.155 Once an accident occurred, the driver
was required to prove the ability to pay future damages,156 typically
demonstrated by purchasing insurance. The potential inability to pay
146. Id.
147. Id. at 249–50.
148. Id. at 249.
149. Id. at 268.
150. Id.
151. Paul J. Barringer et al., Administrative Compensation of Medical Injuries: A Hardy
Perennial Blooms Again, 33 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 725, 732 (2008) (noting that, of the sixteen
states, twelve retain some version of no-fault law today).
152. For a more detailed account of the routinization of automobile accident claims, see
Christopher J. Robinette, Two Roads Diverge for Civil Recourse Theory, 88 IND. L.J. 543, 550–66
(2013).
153. 1925 Mass. Acts 426–31.
154. 1925 Conn. Pub. Acts 3956–58.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., 6 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 61.01 (Jeffrey E.
Thomas & Christopher J. Robinette eds., 2020).

364

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:343

damages for the initial accident was a weakness of financial responsibility
laws, and compulsory laws became the dominant approach to automobile
insurance. Today, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have
enacted compulsory automobile insurance laws.157 As noted by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts: “The purpose of the compulsory motor
vehicle insurance law is not, like ordinary insurance, to protect the owner or
operator alone from loss, but rather is to provide compensation to persons
injured through the operation of the automobile insured by the owner.”158
By the time of the Columbia Plan in 1932,159 it was already obvious that
liability insurance for automobile accidents dramatically liberalized recovery
of compensation. The Committee reviewed 2,500 closed cases of temporary
disability involving insured defendants and 900 cases involving uninsured
defendants.160 Claimants received payment in 86% of the insured cases, but
only 27% of the uninsured cases.161 In cases of permanent disability,
claimants received payment in 96% of the 192 closed cases with insured
defendants, but only 21% of the 90 cases with uninsured defendants.162 The
Committee opined, “[I]nsurance companies pay in so large a proportion of
the cases in which liability insurance is carried, that the principle of liability
without fault seems almost to be recognized.”163
Regarding automobile accident claims, compensation was not simply
conditioned on the fault of the tortfeasor and the lack of fault by the victim;
instead “the theory of full compensation or none yields to the practice of
partial compensation in almost every one of the multitude of settlements.”164
Keeton & O’Connell attributed this to settlement practices: Because of the
large number of insureds, insurers take a collective view of risk, appraising
claims “impersonally by standards appropriate to the management of a large
pool of risks.”165 An individual claim will settle “whenever this can be done
for a sum representing an appropriate discount from the probable amount of
an award if the case should be tried and lost. This discount is tailored to the
degree of likelihood that the insurer would win if the claim were litigated.”166

157. See, e.g., id. at § 61.02[1] (stating that New Hampshire has a financial responsibility law).
Virginia recently revised its statutes to allow motorists to pay an uninsured motorist fee as an
alternative to compulsory insurance. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-706 (2020).
158. Wheeler v. O’Connell, 9 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Mass. 1937).
159. See COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note 130.
160. Id. at 203.
161. Id. at 204.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 203.
164. KEETON & O’CONNELL, supra note 137, at 254.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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Insurers will pay money to some cases it could have won at trial, but will
make that up in other cases by settling for less than it would have lost at trial.
“The insurer’s major concern is the most economical allocation of available
funds to all the claims in the risk pool.”167
Laurence Ross shed light on the role of insurance adjusters in the claims
process in his major empirical study of claims practices, chronicled in Settled
Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims Adjustments.168 Ross’s
study supported the assertions in the Columbia Plan and by Keeton &
O’Connell that the fault standard was not strictly applied in automobile
accident cases. Based on formal law, which included the absolute bar of
contributory negligence in most jurisdictions at the time, “a literal application
of these rules would result in very few recoveries.”169 But the files Ross
reviewed told a different story: In the “large majority of cases . . . a claimant
who has provable economic loss will recover something.” 170 Additionally,
complete denials of compensation were “very largely confined to trivial
losses.”171
Ross attributed these results to insurance and the role of adjusters. He
concluded that adjusters were pressured to close cases promptly, and that the
easiest way to do so was to pay claimants.172 Ross also found that adjusters
understood liability in mechanical, not moral, terms.173 Using bright-line
traffic laws instead of the complex “reasonable person” standard,174 adjusters
put cases into broad categories such as “rear-enders, red-light cases, stop sign
cases, and the like.”175 In terms of damages, most cases are simply valued by
some multiple of medical bills. 176 Ross believed that payment followed
liability and damages, as interpreted by the insurer.177 The limitations,
however, were very loose, particularly regarding liability: “As liability

167. Id.
168. H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS (1970). Ross recruited three large insurers to cooperate in his study. From
the companies, he interviewed sixty-seven adjusters and their supervisors in six different locations.
He supplemented the interviews with field observations of the adjusters, notes from negotiation
session between adjusters and plaintiffs’ lawyers, and interviews with plaintiffs’ lawyers.
Additionally, Ross tested his hypotheses with an analysis of 2,216 bodily injury claims closed by
one of the insurers in a two-month period in 1962. Id. at 9–12.
169. Id. at 199.
170. Id. at 81.
171. Id. at 247.
172. Id. at 19.
173. Id. at 21.
174. Id. at 98.
175. Id. at 135.
176. Id. at 107–08.
177. Id. at 21.
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becomes more questionable, the claim becomes ‘worth’ less in the adjuster’s
eyes. When there are strong doubts as to the insured’s negligence,
or . . . evidence of contributory negligence[,] . . . the adjuster will define the
claims as one ‘for compromise.’”178 Even under these circumstances, “the
adjuster is reluctant to pay less than medical bills.”179 Importantly, Ross also
found that some payment is made in most cases with high damages, without
regard to the facts on liability. 180 Although formal law becomes more
important as the size of the claim increases, Ross found evidence of
routinization even in larger cases. Ross concluded, “even a highly
individualistic law, when required to handle masses of cases, becomes
categorical.”181
Routinization was aided by the rise of repeat players on the plaintiffs’
side. Plaintiffs’ lawyers in the early twentieth century did not generally
approach automobile accidents in a coordinated, systematic manner.182
Samuel Issacharoff and John Witt chronicled these changes, which began in
1946 when a group of workers’ compensation claimants’ lawyers formed the
National Association of Claimants’ Compensation Attorneys (“NACCA”).183
In a few years, NACCA began to focus on tort cases, including automobile
accidents. Group members shared information on trial and settlement
practices, helping them overcome the informational advantages insurers had
long held.184 In addition to the sharing of information, referral networks were
created, leading to specialization for plaintiffs’ lawyers.185 As a result,
generalists handled automobile accidents less often.186
Having specialists on both sides of cases brought advantages. The
“presence of bargaining agents who knew the short-cuts, the heuristics, and
the rules-of-thumb often made the settlement process considerably more
efficient.”187 Sometimes adjusters and plaintiffs’ lawyers would swap cases,
meaning if one case was settled at 50%, then another would be as well.188
They also often created “package-deals” in which a number of cases were

178. Id. at 51.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 202–03.
181. Id. at 23.
182. There were isolated exceptions in certain urban areas. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS
AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 267 (2007).
183. Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1610 (2004).
184. WITT, supra note 182, at 243.
185. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 183, at 1611.
186. Id. at 1611–12, 1614.
187. Id. at 1614. Not all of the efficiency advantages are ethically permissible.
188. Id. at 1611–12.
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settled at a time.189 The efficiency created by routinization meant that by the
mid-1960s automobile accident claims were being settled much faster than
other tort claims.190 Because automobile accident claims provided efficient
compensation to many more victims than formal doctrine would have
allowed, Issacharoff & Witt compared automobile accident claims to
workers’ compensation claims. They stated: “The striking feature is the
similarity of the mature tort injury system in auto claims to the administrative
system of workmen’s compensation.”191
Routinization on the plaintiffs’ side has taken one further step, as
described by Nora Engstrom. In the course of the last several decades,
settlement mills have developed as a new business model for plaintiffs’
personal injury firms.192 According to Engstrom, settlement mills are “highvolume personal injury law practices that aggressively advertise and mass
produce the resolution of claims, typically with little client interaction and
without initiating lawsuits, much less taking claims to trial.” 193 Claims
arising from automobile accidents are the hallmark claims of settlement
mills.194 For settlement mills, “[e]fficiency trumps process and quality.”195
Mills typically accept almost any case; Engstrom interviewed one mill
employee who stated that the “modus operandi was to sign everything up.”196
Despite this lack of quality control, cases in which an insurer makes no offer
are very rare.197 Although ostensibly operating pursuant to formal law,
settlement mills function more like no-fault insurance, providing “fairly
certain and standardized sums at relatively low systemic cost.”198 In doing
so, the informal routinization of automobile claims accomplished what
formal tort reform could not.
As with workers’ compensation, however, not all of the benefits flow to
plaintiffs, defendants and insurers benefit, as well. Defendants’ liability
payments are more predictable, and transaction costs, such as time and
attorneys’ fees, are reduced. Insurers receive what they perhaps want the
most—predictability—and smaller payments in a lot of cases. In many ways,
the informal reform of automobile accident claims reached the same
189. Id. at 1614 (quoting Comment, Settlement of Personal Injury Cases in the Chicago Area,
47 NW. U. L. REV. 895, 904–05, 904 n.48 (1953)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1615.
192. Engstrom, supra note 16, at 1486.
193. Id.
194. Engstrom, supra note 24, at 807.
195. Engstrom, supra note 16, at 1493.
196. Id. at 1499 (quoting Telephone Interview with D.R. (Apr. 3, 2008)).
197. Id. at 1517 n.207.
198. Engstrom, supra note 24, at 809.
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outcomes as the formal reform of workplace accident claims. In both
instances, surges of tort claims led to a compensatory reformulation of the
law that provides some benefits to all the parties involved.
C. Mass Disasters
Over the last two decades, in response to certain tragedies, both
legislatures and private corporations have set up funds to compensate victims
of specific mass disasters.199 These mass disasters, and the funds created in
their wakes, follow the pattern. A surge of injuries highlights the limitations
of resolving claims through tort law; a compensatory work-around is created
that has benefits for claimants and potential defendants. The fact that fault
and responsibility are essentially the same with respect to each victim makes
case-by-case negligence liability particularly unattractive. As Robert Rabin
notes, “What all of this adds up to is compensation as a focal point in a new
guise.”200 I discuss three examples: (1) the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, (2) the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust, and (3) the
General Motors (“GM”) Ignition Switch Fund.
1. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered the worst terrorist
attack in its history when Al Qaeda hijackers flew airplanes into the World
Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Virginia, and—thanks to
heroic passengers—a field in Pennsylvania.201 Within days, Congress
created the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.202 The Fund’s dual
purpose was to compensate the victims of the tragic attack and to protect
airlines from crippling tort liability.203 The gist of the Fund was that
claimants would receive no-fault compensation from the federal government
in exchange for relinquishing the right to sue in tort anyone other than the
hijackers and their accomplices.204
199. Robert L. Rabin, Jeffrey O’Connell and the Compensation Principle in Accident Law:
Institutional and Intellectual Perspectives, 6 J. TORT L. 3, 24 n.84 (2013) (defining mass disasters
“loosely to include multiple injuries from randomly generated killing sprees, as well as acts not
necessarily suited for formal class action treatment”).
200. Id. at 26.
201. Sean K. Mangan, Compensation for “Certain” Victims of Terrorism Under Section 2002
of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Individual Payments at an
Institutional Cost, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1037, 1059 n.132 (2002).
202. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 401, 115
Stat. 230, 237 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)).
203. Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed
Response or an Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 771, 783–84 (2003).
204. Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in Compensating Victims of September 11, 49
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 573 (2001); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror
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The rules and procedures of the Fund were to be promulgated and
administered by a “Special Master,” who was appointed by the Attorney
General of the United States.205 Kenneth Feinberg was appointed Special
Master in November 2001.206 Each claimant was required to fill out a form
providing: (1) claimant’s physical harm suffered or, if filing on behalf of a
decedent, proof of death; (2) economic and noneconomic losses suffered; and
(3) any collateral sources, such as life insurance, received or pending.207 The
Special Master was required to review the claim and make a determination
within 120 days of the filing of the claim.208 The claimant need only prove
they were: (1) present at the scene of the crash sites at the time or in the
immediate aftermath of the attacks and suffered physical injuries or death,
(2) a member of the flight crew or passenger on one of the flights, or (3) a
representative thereof.209 Economic loss specific to lost wages was
determined by “a ‘presumed economic loss’ schedule based on age, size of
family, and recent past earnings.”210 Under the schedule, however, a claimant
received no credit for annual gross income over $200,000.211 Noneconomic
loss for an eligible death was limited to “$250,000 plus an additional
$100,000 for the spouse and each dependent of the deceased victim.”212
Punitive damages were not available.213 Payment from the Fund was required
within twenty days of the Special Master’s determination, 214 and was not
subject to judicial review.215
The Fund differed from tort liability in several ways. First, neither fault
nor causation needed to be proved. Relatedly, delay and transaction costs
were dramatically reduced. Under the Fund, a claimant would have
compensation within 140 days of filing a claim.216 Attorneys and experts
were not required for the process, and many lawyers offered pro bono

Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 632 (2003). I am describing the original 9/11
Victim Compensation Fund that operated until 2004. The Fund was reactivated in 2011 and
reauthorized in 2015. A more comprehensive overview of the Fund can be found at About the
Victim Compensation Fund, SEPT. 11TH VICTIM COMP. FUND, https://www.vcf.gov/about (last
visited Feb. 3, 2021).
205. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 404(a), 115 Stat. at 237–38.
206. Rabin, supra note 204, at 582.
207. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(a), 115 Stat. at 238.
208. Id. § 405(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 239.
209. Id. § 405(c)(2)(A)–(C), 115 Stat. at 238.
210. Rabin, supra note 204, at 584.
211. 28 C.F.R. § 104.43 (2020).
212. Id. § 104.44.
213. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(5), 115 Stat at 239.
214. Id. § 406(a), 115 Stat. at 240.
215. Id. § 405(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 239.
216. Alexander, supra note 204, at 716–17.
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services, so transaction costs were limited.217 On the other hand, damages
were also limited: There were, effectively, caps on both economic and
noneconomic loss, and punitive damages were unavailable.218 Moreover,
collateral sources were subtracted from awards provided by the Fund. In
general, those who sued recovered more than twice the average recovery of
the Fund.219 In a highly unusual alteration, the federal government provided
the money for the awards made by the Fund instead of the airlines.220 Among
other things, due to the taxing power of the federal government, this virtually
eliminated the possibility of non-payment due to insufficient funds.
The benefits to each side are clear: Claimants received no-fault payment
very quickly with minimal transaction costs. The airline defendants received
protection from tort liability beyond the amount of their insurance, and an
opportunity to avoid years of acrimonious litigation. The federal government
symbolically stood behind the sympathetic victims of a horrendous terror
attack and protected the very useful airlines serving its citizens from
bankruptcy. Special Master Feinberg emphasized that “the pathway of tort
was littered with obstacles.”221 His administration of the Fund was “aimed
at encouraging victims to forego the uncertainties and delays associated with
tort in favor of immediate recourse to no-fault compensation for cabined
recovery of out-of-pocket and intangible loss.”222 Ultimately, 97% of eligible
claimants waived tort liability in exchange for an award from the Fund.223
2. BP Oil Spill Fund/Gulf Coast Claims Facility
On April 20, 2010, the petroleum company BP created a catastrophic oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico.224 Several months later, BP formed a
compensation fund in response to pressure from President Barack Obama that
claimants be fairly paid from a fund independent of BP.225 Under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”),226 BP was designated the responsible party
217. Id. at 648, 716.
218. Id. at 649.
219. Benjamin Weiser, Value of Suing Over 9/11 Deaths Is Still Unsettled, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
12, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/13/nyregion/13lawsuits.html. The amount recovered
in suit, however, was then reduced by attorneys’ fees and costs and was achieved years later. Id.
220. John King et al., Bush Signs Airline Bailout Package, CNN (Sept. 23, 2001, 8:49 AM),
https://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/22/rec.airline.deal/.
221. Rabin, supra note 199, at 25 (citing KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? 17–19
(2005)).
222. Id. (citing KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? 161 (2005)).
223. Id. (citing KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? 161 (2005)).
224. Byron G. Stier, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as Quasi-Public Fund: Transparency and
Independence in Claim Administrator Compensation, 30 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 255, 259 (2011).
225. Id. at 256, 261.
226. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2011).
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for the spill and was to be held strictly liable for losses, which included
“removal costs, natural resource damages, personal property damages and
attendant economic loss, loss of profits resulting from destruction of real or
personal property or natural resources, and lost taxes and fees.”227 OPA caps
the responsible party’s liability at $75 million plus cleanup costs, unless
negligence, willful misconduct, or violation of applicable regulations is
proved.228 Claims are made to the responsible party, and, if not denied or
settled in ninety days, the victim may sue.229
The fund was to be stocked with $20 billion provided by BP and sought
“releases from claimants of litigation against BP.” 230 Gulf Coast Claims
Facility (“GCCF”) was the entity created to distribute the $20 billion BP
fund.231 GCCF sought to pay not only OPA claims, but “state-tort claims for
physical injury and death” as well.232 Kenneth Feinberg was named the
GCCF Claims Administrator.233
Eligibility was dependent upon a
combination of loss location and business type.234
Claimants were divided into four groups.235 Group 1 was composed of
claimants that were “heavily dependent on Gulf resources and tourism and
were located in zip codes that bordered the Gulf shore.”236 They could
recover even if evidence linking the claimant’s loss to the oil spill was not
submitted.237 Group 2 consisted of “individuals and businesses that were
located in the Gulf Alliance counties, but were not in zip codes that bordered
the Gulf shore, as well as businesses that, while located in zip codes that
bordered the Gulf shore, were not heavily reliant on Gulf resources and
tourism.”238
To determine eligibility, claimants in Group 2 were first subjected to a
“Financial Test,” comparing their post-spill income in 2010 to other recent
periods.239 Even if the claimant failed the Financial Test by not establishing
a sufficient post-spill decline, eligibility could be established by providing a
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Stier, supra note 224, at 259–60 (footnotes omitted) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2702).
33 U.S.C. §§ 2704(a)(1), (c)(1).
Id. § 2713(c).
Stier, supra note 224, at 255–56, 261.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY:
REPORT OF FINDINGS & OBSERVATIONS TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 39 (2012),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/66520126611210351178.pdf.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 40.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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“specific causation document” linking a claimant’s losses to the spill, such
as a canceled contract.240 Claimants in Group 3 “either were not located on
the Gulf shore or Gulf Alliance counties, or were businesses or the employees
of businesses that were not heavily reliant on Gulf resources and tourism.”241
Eligibility for compensation required claimants in Group 3 to pass both the
Financial Test and provide a specific causation document.242 “Group 4
consisted of claimants in business types that were deemed ineligible for
compensation at various times by the GCCF.”243
In terms of time, distribution of the funds was divided into phases.244 In
Phase I, the first six months after the oil spill, payments were made based on
lesser documentation than would be required later.245 The goal was to make
these emergency payments “as quickly as possible” to stabilize struggling
claimants.246 Claimants did not waive their right to sue by accepting
emergency payments, but final settlements were reduced accordingly.247 In
Phase II, claimants were allowed to choose among a quick payment, an
interim payment, and a final payment.248 A quick payment, $5,000 to an
individual or $25,000 to a business, was available to claimants that had taken
an emergency payment or an interim payment from the GCCF, and was
available without providing additional documentation.249 It required
claimants to release their right to seek further compensation in relation to the
spill.250 Interim payments compensated claimants for “all past documented
damage” due to the spill and allowed claimants to make further claims against
the fund once each quarter to seek additional compensation.251 Claimants
were required to provide documentation, but were not required to provide a
release.252 Final payments compensated claimants for “all documented past
damage plus estimated future damage” caused by the spill; claimants were
required to release their right to any further compensation in relation to the
spill.253
240. Id. at 37, 40.
241. Id. at 41.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 28–56 (describing GCCF Phase I and Phase II).
245. Id. at 29.
246. Id. at 30.
247. Myriam Gilles, Public-Private Approaches to Mass Tort Victim Compensation: Some
Thoughts on the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 419, 434 (2012).
248. BDO CONSULTING, supra note 234, at 34–35.
249. Gilles, supra note 247, at 436 n.97.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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GCCF determinations regarding the payment of interim and final
payments were to be made within ninety days of being presented.254 Payment
to the claimant had to be made within fourteen days of receipt of the signed
release.255 As with the 9/11 Fund, damages were restricted.256 GCCF did not
make any payments for alleged punitive damages.257 GCCF also “deduct[ed]
and offset prior payments by BP or other sources,” such as insurance, “from
the final settlement amounts.”258
The BP fund differed from tort liability in several ways. Claimants were
not required to prove fault due to the OPA’s strict liability standard.259
Partially because of strict liability, and partially because the goal of the fund
was to counteract an economic threat by providing money quickly, delay and
transaction costs were reduced.260 Emergency payments were available
within the first six months of the oil spill. 261 In Phase II, GCCF protocols
required making decisions on interim and final payments within ninety days
of receiving them, and actually paying the claims within fourteen days of
receiving a signed release.262 Transaction costs were reduced; only three
percent of claimants hired a lawyer.263 On the other hand, damages were
limited. Collateral sources were deducted from settlement amounts and
“capped” in the sense that all payments had to be made from the available
funds. Punitive damages were not available.264
Again, the benefits to claimants and BP are clear. Claimants received
swift compensation, in many cases, when it was urgently needed, with low
transaction costs. Moreover, the placement of funds in the hands of GCCF

254. BDO CONSULTING, supra note 234, at Exhibit Q § V(A)(1) (“Gulf Coast Claims Facility
Protocol for Interim and Final Claims”).
255. Id. at Exhibit Q § V(F).
256. See supra notes 211–215 and accompanying text (describing the limitations to available
damages for the 9/11 Fund).
257. Stier, supra note 224, at 263.
258. Gilles, supra note 247, at 438.
259. Stier, supra note 224, at 259.
260. Id. at 256 (“Created quickly in response to a still-unfolding crisis and crafted in part by an
executive branch that should be committed to public justice, the quasi-public fund allows for
relatively swift movement of compensation to claimants. The BP Gulf oil spill posed a systemic
threat to the Gulf-area economy—slow-moving trial verdicts may not have prevented a downward
economic spiral as coastal businesses closed.”).
261. See supra notes 245–247 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 254–255 and accompanying text.
263. Stier, supra note 224, at 264 n.74. Feinberg and his office, however, became a significant
transaction cost: At the height of the work, BP Feinberg’s office—“three lawyers and about five
staff members”—received $1.25 million per month. Roger Parloff, From 9/11 to Orlando, Ken
Feinberg’s Alter Ego in Compensating Victims, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/business/ken-feinberg-compensation-fund.html.
264. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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removed the fear of BP’s insolvency due to a flood of claims. BP was able
to protect itself from a large number of claims with relatively circumscribed
awards. BP benefited when claimants elected the fund because there was a
real possibility that damage awards from lawsuits would be extremely high
because of the tragedy and possible jury mindsets.265 In processing more than
one million claims, GCCF paid out $6.2 billion to over 220,000 claimants in
its year and a half of operation; 97% of payments were made to claimants in
the Gulf states.266
3. GM Ignition Switch Fund
Compared to the other two funds, the GM Ignition Switch Fund was
simple. It did not involve legislation or the government; it was a business
directly compensating victims of wrongdoing in exchange for releases of
claims.267 In 2014, after delaying action for several years,268 GM issued a
recall on 2.6 million small cars due to a faulty ignition switch.269 While a car
was being driven, the ignition switch could slip out of the run position; the
car would stall, and the power steering, power brakes, and air bags would be
disabled.270 The faulty ignition switch resulted in at least 169 deaths, and 124
wrongful death cases.271
By March 2014, GM retained Kenneth Feinberg as a consultant to
explore options for compensating the victims.272 He was given “sole
discretion” in deciding both the eligibility and the amount a victim would
receive.273 GM agreed to honor Feinberg’s decisions: “No appeals. No

265. Gilles, supra note 247, at 447.
266. BDO CONSULTING, supra note 234, at 59–60.
267. Gabe Nelson, Feinberg Details Eligibility for GM Ignition-Switch Compensation, AUTO.
NEWS (June 30, 2014, 1:00 AM), https://www.autonews.com/article/20140630/OEM11/
140639993/feinberg-details-eligibility-for-gm-ignition-switch-compensation.
268. Tanya Basu, Timeline: A History of GM’s Ignition Switch Defect, NPR (Mar. 31, 2014,
4:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/03/31/297158876/timeline-a-history-of-gms-ignition-switchdefect.
269. Tom Krisher, GM Ignition Switch Fund Rejected 91% of Claims, USA TODAY (Aug. 24,
2015, 4:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2015/08/24/gm-ignition-switchfund/32282521/.
270. Id.
271. Associated Press, GM Ignition Switch Fund Pays Out $594.5 Million, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10,
2015, 2:32 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-1211-ge-ignition-claims-20151210story.html.
272. Jeff Plungis & Tim Higgins, GM Hires Feinberg to Handle Recall; CEO Barra Testifies
Before Congress, INS. J. (Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/04
/01/325021.htm.
273. Gabe Nelson, Feinberg Details Eligibility for GM Ignition-Switch Compensation, AUTO.
NEWS (June 30, 2014, 1:00 AM), https://www.autonews.com/article/20140630/OEM11/
140639993/feinberg-details-eligibility-for-gm-ignition-switch-compensation.
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rejection. It must pay it.”274 Feinberg required that claimants provide
evidence, even if circumstantial, that the faulty ignition switch caused their
injuries.275 He further determined that victims would not be excluded from
the fund based on contributory negligence.276 GM did not “cap” the fund;
there was no limit on the aggregate amount of money that GM would pay
under the fund.277
In awarding damages, Feinberg used a formula that relied on national
averages for settlement values of economic and noneconomic losses.278 In
death cases, economic losses were based on the victim’s age, salary,
historical earnings and dependents; noneconomic payouts were $1 million
for the deceased and “$300,000 each for the surviving spouse and any
dependents.”279 National averages were used in cases of living victims as
well.280 For example, victims who spent between eight and fifteen days in a
hospital would be paid $170,000.281 Victims were allowed to choose a
standard amount based on averages or request an individualized calculation
based on “extraordinary circumstances.”282 Simple cases were paid in ninety
days, while more complex cases were paid in 180 days.283
The fund was different than tort law in several important ways. First,
proving fault was not required and contributory negligence was irrelevant;
proof of causation was sufficient. Partially because of this, delay and
transaction costs were reduced. Eligible claims were paid in 90 or 180 days.
On the other hand, compensation was typically based on an average
settlement figure, generally less than would be potentially available in tort.
Punitive damages were not available.284
The fund provided benefits to both sides. Claimants recovered
reasonable compensation swiftly with low transaction costs. GM resolved
claims more efficiently than through the tort system and avoided blockbuster
verdicts. GM further earned the good will of admitting error and
compensating for it. Over the course of the fund, Feinberg paid out $594.5

274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. David Shepardson, GM Fund Approves $594.5 Million in Ignition Claims, REUTERS (Dec.
10, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gm-recall-compensation/gm-fund-approves-594-5million-in-ignition-claims-idUSKBN0TT0DE20151210.
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million in order to settle 399 claims.285 Claimants receiving settlement offers
through the fund accepted them over 90% of the time.286
Funds are proliferating as a way to resolve a large number of tort claims.
Linda Mullenix states: “The twenty-first century may very well mark both
the advent and triumph of fund approaches to resolving mass tort
litigation.”287 It is important to note, however, that these funds and the
concept of funds generally have been criticized extensively. As indicated,
Kenneth Feinberg administered all of the funds in this section. He has been
accused of being too close to the sponsors of the funds,288 as well as
questioned about the amount and process of his compensation.289 The funds
have been accused of being insufficiently transparent,290 and failing to meet
the requirements of procedural justice.291 Perhaps most significantly, given
the importance of choice on the part of the claimants, funds have been
criticized on the grounds of lack of informed consent.292
My limited purpose in this Article is not to endorse any particular fund,
or even the general concept of funds. Instead, it is to demonstrate that a
285. Associated Press, supra note 271.
286. Id.
287. Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Funds and the Election of Remedies: The Need for Informed
Consent, 31 REV. LITIG. 833, 833 (2012). Funds are currently being used to compensate victims of
child molestation at the hands of priests employed by the Catholic Church. See, e.g., Associated
Press, Pennsylvania Dioceses Offer $84M to 564 Clergy Abuse Victims, CBS PITTSBURGH (Dec.
26, 2019, 10:06 AM), https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2019/12/26/pennsylvania-dioceses-offer84m-to-564-clergy-abuse-victims/.
288. John Schwartz, Man With $20 Billion to Disburse Finds No Shortage of Claims or Critics,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/us/19feinberg.html (reporting
that “plaintiffs’ lawyers say he is working for BP”).
289. Stier, supra note 224, at 255. Feinberg did not take any compensation for administering
the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund. Mike Steenson & Joseph Michael Sayler, The Legacy of the
9/11 Fund and the Minnesota I-35W Bridge-Collapse Fund: Creating a Template for Compensating
Victims of Future Mass-Tort Catastrophes, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 524, 535 (2009). His law
firm, however, received $850,000 a month from BP at one point. Stier, supra note 224, at 255.
That figure rose to $1.25 million at the height of their work. Parloff, supra note 263.
290. Schwartz, supra note 288 (discussing complaints that the BP claims process was “opaque
at best”).
291. E.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a Means
for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 914–15 (2011).
292. Mullenix, supra note 287, at 837–38 (“[M]ore consideration ought to be given to whether
mass tort claimants—often under pressure or physical or psychological distress—have received
sufficient neutral, dispassionate information to make an informed judgment concerning whether
they should elect to receive compensation from the fund and forgo litigation or other alternative
dispute resolution options.”). That claimants choose compensation from a fund knowingly and
willingly is particularly important in light of a study finding that many claimants viewed the decision
as one “between money and a host of nonmonetary values that [study] respondents thought they
might obtain from litigation.” Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the
Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & S OC’Y REV. 645,
647 (2008).
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substantial number of claimants are attracted to the compromise of more
swift and certain compensation, even if it means less of it. As noted, 97% of
potential plaintiffs chose to use the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund 293 and
over 90% of potential plaintiffs receiving an offer from the GM fund accepted
it.294 Those percentages are overwhelming, even if one accepts for the
purposes of argument imperfections in the informed consent process.295
The details of the foregoing discussion can be distracting, but for our
purposes, there are a few salient points. Tort history reveals that
compensation has been important for a portion of claimants in the tort system
for well over a century, even during more admonitory phases of tort law.
Compensatory preferences have resulted in workers’ compensation, no-fault
auto laws and routinized auto claims, and various compensation funds.
Plaintiffs motivated by compensation are the norm, not the exception.
Attempting to accommodate their preferences is better than dismissing them.
Moreover, surges in accidents tend to heighten the need for compensation
and make it more possible due to the ability to routinize claims. Finally, there
is a pattern to the compensatory solutions created to resolve accident surges:
A compromise is enacted in which plaintiffs receive funds more certainly and
swiftly, but in lesser amounts.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, there is a percentage of plaintiffs, likely substantial, for
whom compensation—the replacement of lost funds—is the primary
motivating factor in filing a tort claim. The open-textured nature of most tort
cases, which may assist in an individualized justice procedure attempting to
vindicate rights, is ill-suited to compensation. Such uncertainty is slow and
costly. Tort history reveals that a portion of plaintiffs have been motivated
by compensation for well over a century, and that becomes most apparent in
surges of accidents. Tort law is often beset by such surges; they are a blessing
and a curse. Waves of injuries involve pain and need, but they also focus
attention on a problem and invite solutions. Moreover, the sheer number of
injuries means that their resolution can be routinized. Although routinization
has occurred in different ways, a pattern of compromise benefiting both
parties has emerged. Compensation for injuries becomes swifter and more
certain, but in lesser amounts.

293. Rabin, supra note 203, at 792 n.79.
294. Associated Press, supra note 271.
295. Regarding the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, Mullenix states the “claimants seemingly
had relatively good information and assistance of counsel available to make an informed decision
about their election of remedies.” Mullenix, supra note 287, at 838.
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A pressure-release valve, designed to remove compensation-oriented
cases from wrongs-based tort law, would benefit the plaintiffs and defendants
in those tort cases, as well as reserve the tort system for those interested in
righting wrongs. Following the pattern of the Grand Bargain and the
structure of the more modern settlement funds, such compensatory cases
should be resolved much more swiftly and certainly than cases in the
traditional tort system, but with reduced damages.
The solutions seen in the prior section—workers’ compensation,
routinized automobile accident claims procedures, and compensation
funds—have many positive attributes, but also limitations. Workers’
compensation is both under- and over-inclusive. It is only available for
workplace accidents, leaving all other injuries to the challenges of the tort
system. On the other hand, it almost completely replaces tort law for injuries
in the workplace. If the parties want a wrongs-based, individualized justice
ruling, it is not available to them. The routinization of the automobile
accident claims process has similar problems: It is only available for those
injured in automobile accidents. On the other hand, routinized claims
procedures are not necessarily best for all automobile accident victims. In
particular, clients accepting the services of settlement mills, which have
ethical issues,296 are often unaware of the type of representation they are
selecting.297 Especially in the case of serious injuries, the failure to
understand the limited quality of settlement mills can be costly. 298 Finally,
mass disaster compensation funds only compensate those injured in very
specific circumstances. Moreover, to be legitimate, such funds must be
transparent and include fair procedures, most importantly assuring informed
consent on the part of those choosing the fund compensation.
Most of tort law is not properly designed to meet the compensatory
goals of a large number of claimants. What is needed is a way to bypass tort
law in cases better suited for compensation, while leaving wrongsadjudication in place as the default.299 Designing such a bypass is
challenging, but worth the effort. If successful, it would incorporate
compensation into wrongs-based tort law, smoothing the vacillation Ted
White describes between admonitory and compensatory phases in tort. 300
296. Engstrom, supra note 16, at 1547 (“[T]hose who have meritorious claims and have been
seriously injured are least apt to benefit from [settlement mills], raising profound ethical and public
policy issues deserving detailed scrutiny by academics, bar organizations, and the judiciary.”).
297. Engstrom, supra note 24, at 837.
298. Id. at 838–41.
299. An alternative, beyond the scope of this paper, is also to move to collective or enterprise
responsibility for activities, leaving wrongs for acts. Keating, supra note 119, at 367–69. See
generally Gregory C. Keating, Products Liability as Enterprise Liability, 10 J. TORT L. 41 (2017).
300. See G. EDWARD WHITE, supra note 1, at 291.
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Additionally, the search for a way to fairly compensate those claimants who
are not seeking vindication may create common ground on tort reform. A
simpler, cheaper procedure with decreased pain and suffering damages would
be fairer than some current reforms, like caps on damages, yet potentially
generate the savings desired by business interests.

